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ABSTRACT
Spoofing attacks on biometric systems can seriously compro-
mise their practical utility. In this paper we focus on face
spoofing detection. The majority of papers on spoofing at-
tack detection formulate the problem as a two or multiclass
learning task, attempting to separate normal accesses from
samples of different types of spoofing attacks. In this pa-
per we adopt the anomaly detection approach proposed in [1],
where the detector is trained on genuine accesses only using
one-class classifiers and investigate the merit of subject spe-
cific solutions. We show experimentally that subject specific
models are superior to the commonly used client independent
method. We also demonstrate that the proposed approach is
more robust than multiclass formulations to unseen attacks.
Index Terms— Face anti-spoofing, Anomaly detection,
client-specific information, one-class classification, Convolu-
tional neural networks
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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the significant improvements attained in biometric
devices, spoofing attacks are recognised as a considerable
threat to face recognition systems where an impostor tries
to access a service illegally by using a variety of different
approaches of face presentation attacks (PA). Although there
have been many different types of PAs in spoofing scenar-
ios, print attack, replay attack, and 3D mask are much more
accessible to fraudsters and are commonly encountered in
practice. Due to diversity of spoofing attacks, there is an
increasing need to design a face recognition system that can
detect novel and unknown types of spoofing attempts.
In order to counteract PAs, the majority of approaches
[2, 3] formulate the problem as two-class classification to
learn distinguishable cues separating genuine access and at-
tack attempts. However, the two-class formulation in real-
world scenarios does not perform robustly due to its poor gen-
eralisation performance in the presence of novel attack types
[4]. Another drawback of the two-class classification methods
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is that finding an optimised boundary to differentiate between
various attack categories from genuine access data is not a
straightforward task due to the class imbalance problem, the
difficulty of collecting spoofing attack samples and cross de-
vice variability [1].
To address the aforementioned shortcomings, the authors
in [1] propose an anomaly detection system that considers
genuine data as normal observations and impostor attacks as
anomalous samples. The apparent superiority of anomaly de-
tection learners, so called one-class classifiers, compared to
two-class classification methods is that they can be robust to
previously unseen and innovative attacks [1]. In this paper
we build on this approach, and being inspired by the recent
advances of convolutional neural networks (CNN) in the anti-
spoofing studies [5, 6, 7], our one-class classifiers are built
using the representations obtained from the deep pre-trained
CNN models. To examine the capability of different CNN
architectures in the anti-spoofing scenarios, face-tuned CNN
networks as well as general object classification CNNs are
chosen to extract features from video frames.
In addition to one-class SVM and one-class SRC that
have been used for spoofing detection previously [1, 4], we
also experiment with two more classification approaches
namely, Mahalanobis Distance(MD) and Gaussian Mixture
Model(GMM) to investigate the capability of probability
estimation based models in anti-spoofing scenarios.
Using anomaly approaches and CNN features, we inves-
tigate the merits of developing client-specific models as com-
pared to the usual client independent setting, since the iden-
tity of a client is known to the biometric system. This mirrors
similar attempts in the context of face recognition [8, 9]. The
idea of using client-specific information for spoofing detec-
tion was first explored in [10]. However, this study related to
the classical multiclass formulation of the spoofing detection
problem. In this paper, we propose the use of subject specific
models in the context of anomaly detection. Moreover, we
advocate the use of client-specific thresholds to improve the
spoofing detection performance further.
We evaluate the proposed solution on benchmarking
spoofing attack datasets, namely Replay-Attack [11] and
Replay-Mobile [12] to make a fair comparison with the state
of the art. The client-specific variant of the anomaly detec-
tion approach requires a new evaluation protocol which we
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introduce for experiments on the new and more challenging
face spoofing dataset of ROSE-Youtu [3], covering a diverse
variety of illumination conditions, camera sources, and attack
types.
The main contributions of this paper include: a) Devel-
oping anomaly detection solutions for the anti-spoofing task
using representations derived by different CNN architectures,
b) building client-specific models for spoofing detection, c)
adopting client-specific thresholds for each model, d) defin-
ing a new evaluation protocol for experimenting on the Rose-
Youtu dataset, e) demonstrating experimentally that the pro-
posed client-specific anomaly detection approach with client-
specific thresholds delivers superior performance and is more
robust to unseen types of attacks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section
2, we introduce the proposed class-specific anomaly detection
framework for anti-spoofing detection. The experimental re-
sults are reported in Section 3. Finally, conclusions are drawn
in Section 4.
2. ANOMALY DETECTION
2.1. Anomaly Classifiers
Anomaly detection is the process of finding patterns deviating
from the expected behavior defined by ”normal” samples of
a training dataset. Therefore, the fundamental task of a one-
class classifier is to detect anomaly observations among test
samples. In the area of face spoofing detection, the anomaly
detection problem is often formulated as a two class prob-
lem, or occasionally, as a one class decision making problem
but with decision thresholds set using some face recognition
system attack samples. This paper considers the classical sce-
nario where only genuine access samples are used for train-
ing. This ”purest” approach is compared with the anomaly
detection mechanism in which some attack data is available
for the system design to gauge the relative merit of positive
class samples on the spoofing attack detection performance.
The anomaly detectors used in this paper include:
One-CLASS SVM: Support Vector Data Description
(SVDD) [13] is a widely used one-class extension of SVM.
SVDD encloses the normal training data by a minimum ra-
dius hypersphere. Outliers are detected as test samples falling
outside the hypershpere.
One-CLASS SRC: Sparse representation based classifier
[14] is a non-parametric outlier detection method assuming
that a test sample can be represented as a sparse linear combi-
nation of available training samples. Here, the reconstruction
error is used to detect outliers.
One-CLASS MD: Assuming that genuine access data
follows a single-mode Gaussian distribution, the Mahalanobis
distance of a test sample to the mean can serve as an output
of a one-class MD spoofing detector.
One-CLASS GMM: A Gaussian mixture model is
a parametric probability density function representing a
weighted sum of Gaussian component densities. Its model
parameters are estimated using the Expectation Maximiza-
tion algorithm [15]. Outliers of the model can be flagged
by measuring the minimum MD to the respective mixture
components.
2.2. client-specific versus Client Independent Anomaly
Detection
In the anomaly based spoofing detection approach the one-
class classifiers are designed using genuine access data. For
each client Ci such normal access data Xi can be the enrol-
ment biometric traits, potentially augmented by operational
data collected during the live operation of an installed bio-
metric system. Each set Xi contains multiple biometric sam-
ples for client Ci. For the conventional, client independent
solution, each one-class model is trained using the union X
of these client dependent sets, i.e. X = ∪iXi. In contrast,
the client-specific designs are trained using the client-specific
sets Xi, i = 1, ...., n, where n denotes the number of clients.
A one-class classifier produces a score for each biometric
trait. For a set of traitsX (Xi) the classifier will generate a set
of scores S (Si). All these scores represent normal accesses.
The assumption is that spoofing attacks would generate scores
that differ from normal scores, and could be detected as out-
liers of the distribution of normal scores. For that we need to
define a threshold. A common practice is to set the threshold
at a predefined level of confidence. This means a threshold
that rejects a given small proportion of normal scores, usually
1-15%. If a development set was available, one could set the
threshold so that the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False
Rejection Rate (FRR) are balanced, producing an equal error
rate (EER). For a client independent model, the threshold T
would be set on the distribution of scores S. In the anomaly
formulation adopted here the Half Total Error Rate (HTER)
would correspond to the operation point defined by the se-
lected level of confidence. We are reporting the results that
correspond to the operation point closest to the EER setting.
For client-specific models we have two options. We can
combine all client-specific score sets into a single set = ∪Si
and determine a single global threshold Tˆ for this merged
population of scores. An alternative is to define client-specific
threshold Ti for each population of scores Si.
The major drawback of a single global threshold is that it
is only applicable if different clients have similar score distri-
butions which is rarely the case in practice. To demonstrate
the significance of a subject specific threshold setting, score
distributions of three clients are depicted in Figure 1. As seen
in the figure, the subject specific threshold of each client can
separate the genuine and attack score distributions, in terms of
HTER, quite well, compared to a single global threshold. The
superiority of using client-specific thresholds derives from the
fact that when data of different clients are combined together,
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it becomes more difficult to find a common threshold that sat-
isfies them jointly. The power of subject specific information
can be gleaned from HTERs of different clients using global
and client-specific thresholds shown in the Table in Figure 1.
Accordingly, the worst case scenario for the spoofing prob-
lem is the red client having a wide attack distribution and a
tight genuine score distribution. It is interesting to note that
the biggest difference in HTERs produced by the two types of
thresholds is achieved by the red client.
Fig. 1. Score distributions and client-specific thresholds of
three different clients using MD classifier and GoogleNet [16]
features. The score distributions of genuine and spoofing
attack samples of different clients are drawn by solid and
dashed lines, respectively. The vertical dashed lines and solid
black line represent the client-specific and global thresholds,
respectively.
For class-independent approaches, it is apparent that find-
ing an optimal hyper-ellipsoid for SVDD in the presence of
diverse score distributions is likely to be more difficult in
compared to class-specific methods. In the case of the one-
class SRC classifier, one can expect both class-specific and
class-independent methods to produce the similar classifica-
tion model. However, the computational complexity of classi-
fier training is a function of training set size. Accordingly, the
convergence time of the class-independent methods is much
greater and will be an important consideration in one-class
classifier selection. It is expected to see a considerable differ-
ence between class-specific and class-independent MDs be-
cause the mean of the merged distribution of scores will differ
from any individual client-specific score distribution. Regard-
ing the comparison of client-specific and client-independent
methods, both approaches have a similar GMM model only if
score distributions of different clients are nearly interchange-
able, which is not the case in the majority of datasets.
2.3. Access Data Representation
Deep networks such as CNNs have received remarkable at-
tention over the last few years. Inspired by this fact, in the
current work, deep pre-trained CNN models are used to ex-
tract features from an image. Networks such as GoogleNet
[16], ResNet50 [17] are categorised in the generic group
while VGG-verydeep-16 [18] and VGG-Face [19] are trained
and tuned for a face classification.
3. EXPERIMENTS
3.1. Datasets and Protocols
The experiments are performed on three anti-spoofing datasets
namely, Replay-Attack, Replay-Mobile, and Rose-Youtu.
The Replay-Attack dataset contains 1,300 genuine and spoof-
ing attack videos from 50 subjects. These videos were cap-
tured under two illumination conditions: controlled and ad-
verse. Three different spoofing types are included: print
attack, video attack, and digital photo. The Replay-Mobile
dataset consists of 1,190 video clips of both real-access and
attack attempts of 40 subjects. The sequences were taken us-
ing two different acquisition devices and five different mobile
scenarios. ROSE-Youtu is the most recent spoofing dataset
covering a large variety of illumination conditions, camera
models, and attack types. This dataset consists of 3,350
videos for 20 subjects. Five mobile phones and five different
illumination conditions were used to collect the dataset.
The enrolment set available for each client is used for
training the class-specific approaches. In compliance with
the anomaly detection formulation, only real-access samples
are used to build both class-specific and class-independent ap-
proaches. For the Rose-Youtu dataset, that does not contain
the enrolment set for each client, a new evaluation protocol is
proposed to implement the class-specific approaches in which
40% of the real-access videos provided for each client is se-
lected to form their enrolment set. The proposed protocol
ensures that an enrolment set contains videos of all lighting
conditions and camera sources.
3.2. Implementation Details
Before feeding video clips to pre-trained networks, each
frame is photometrically normalised based on the retina
method [20] to reduce the impact of different lighting con-
ditions. For the Rose-Youtu dataset, face bounding boxes
are detected by the Viola-Jones algorithm [21]. To extract
representations for the pre-processed video clips, the output
of the pre-ultimate layer of each network is used as features.
The one-class SVM classifier implementation is based on the
SVDD classifier from LIBSVM [22]. The classifier output of
the one-class SVM is a spoofing detection score. In the case
of the MD, the parameters of the Gaussian distribution of
the feature vector are estimated. For each query sample, the
Mahalanobis distance is computed as a detection score. For
GMM classifier, the minimum Mahalanobis distance of a test
sample from all K components is regarded as the spoofing
detection score. The number of mixture components K is set
for each dataset based on grid search using cross validation.
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Table 1. HTER(%) is presented for the test set of Replay-
Attack dataset. The best result is marked in bold.
The Replay-Attack Dataset (HTER%)
SVM SRC MD GMM
Spec Indp Spec Indp Spec Cs-Gb Indp Spec Indp
GoogleNet 16.17 36.35 16.45 18.15 4.04 5.92 17.19 15.89 16.56
ResNet50 11.99 41.66 21.06 19.54 2.82 5.23 15.59 14.44 15.12
VGG-VD-16 10.24 35.65 16.12 14.65 3.26 4.8 13.26 15.03 17.01
VGG-Face 17.33 46.5 19.11 17.45 5.68 7.27 12.75 9.96 12.79
Table 2. HTER(%) is presented for the test set of Replay-
Mobile dataset. The best result is marked in bold.
The Replay-Mobile Dataset (HTER%)
SVM SRC MD GMM
Spec Indp Spec Indp Spec Cs-Gb Indp Spec Indp
GoogleNet 14.34 24.21 21.54 21.78 13.70 15.91 16.74 14.21 15
ResNet50 21.76 35.69 30.75 32.14 21.81 22.05 26.38 21.53 25.77
VGG-VD-16 18.78 30.02 29.65 33.47 19.84 22.17 20.52 18.05 21.03
VGG-Face 34.62 35.49 42.54 46.18 33.25 33.63 33.23 38.5 32.42
3.3. Results
Different combinations of CNNs, classifiers, and datasets are
used to carry out extensive experiments in this section. The
performance is measured using HTER. Tables 1 to 3 report
the HTER on the test set of Replay-Attack, Replay-Mobile,
and Rose-Youtu, respectively. In each Table, ”Spec” de-
notes the client-specific models while ”Indp” represents the
class-independent approaches. Another column, designated
by ”Cs-Gb”, is added to compare the performance of client-
specific models using global and client-specific thresholds.
The global threshold results are reported only for the over-
all best classifier of the Replay-Attack and Replay-Mobile
datasets, and for all classifiers of the Rose-Youtu.
As shown in Table 1, class-specific MD using the ResNet50
representation is the best approach, achieving the minimum
HTER rate of 2.82%. This drops by at least 1.54% if global
thresholds are used instead of the client-specific setting.
Compared to the two-class classifier formulation, our lowest
HTER of 2.82% is superior to the two-class SVM in [11]
by 1.28% and 3.28% in [23]. As is observed in Table 2,
class-specific MD with the GoogleNet features achieved the
best performance among the other methods with the HTER
rate of 13.7%. Again, the performance degrades when us-
ing global thresholds. To compare with two-class methods,
the proposed anomaly detection system with 13.7% HTER
rate is better than 19.87% in [12]. Due to the poor perfor-
mance on the Replay-Attack and Replay-Mobile datasets,
and computational complexity, the SRCs were excluded from
experiments on Rose-Youtu. According to Table 3, the lowest
HTER of 13.6% is obtained by class-specific GMM using
the ResNet50 features. Similar to previous datasets, class-
specific thresholds, compared to the global ones, in Rose-
Youtu dataset give a better solution. Overall, in one-class
SVMs, the gap between the performance of class-specific and
class-independent models is huge since the hypersphere opti-
Table 3. HTER(%) is presented for the test set of Rose-Youtu
dataset. The best result is marked in bold.
The Rose-Youtu Dataset (HTER%)
SVM MD GMM
Spec Cs-Gb Indp Spec Cs-Gb Indp Spec Cs-Gb Indp
GoogleNet 19.99 20.38 25.53 15.8 17.03 20.25 15.79 17.03 19.87
ResNet50 17.72 18.08 23.68 17.23 18.10 20.3 13.6 15.87 18.43
VGG-VD-16 18.73 18.96 23.03 16.57 17.48 19.51 16.05 18.95 20.23
VGG-Face 20.07 20.81 31.73 15.92 17.28 18.26 17.12 18.28 20.49
misation process in the class-independent approaches cannot
be accomplished successfully in the presence of diverse fea-
ture distributions. For one-class SRCs, the performance of
the class-specific models is slightly better than that of class-
independent methods due to the fact that each frame can
be sufficiently reconstructed by a sparse linear combination
of samples. In one-class MDs, class-specific models outper-
form class-independent ones by a large margin because single
mode Gaussian model can better estimate the feature distri-
bution of each individual client. In one-class GMMs, class-
specific models are mostly better than class-independent ones
due to the fact that the mixture of Gaussian components can
cluster the data distribution better when it relates to a single
subject. An additional benefit is gained from using subject
specific thresholds versus global thresholds.
In summary, class-specific approaches perform consis-
tently better than class-independent methods in experiments.
The performance of generic CNN networks is usually better
compared to those tuning for the purpose of face recognition.
Finally, one-class classifiers outperform conventional mul-
ticlass classifiers which confirms the merit of adopting the
anomaly detection formulation in spoofing scenarios.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Motivated by the benefits of the anomaly based approach
to face spoofing detection, we proposed a client-specific ex-
tension of the method to capitalise on its ability to create
sharper genuine access data models. Accordingly, the spoof-
ing attack detectors were designed as one-class classifiers
using normal access data exclusively. We also showed that
the performance of the detectors can further be enhanced by
using client-specific detection thresholds, rather than a global
threshold. Among the machine learning tools considered
for the one-class classifier design, the Gaussian distribution
based statistical hypothesis testing proved most effective,
with the exception of one benchmark dataset where its Gaus-
sian mixture model extension proved preferable. Extensive
experiments involving three spoofing datasets confirmed the
merits of the client-specific anomaly detection approach. The
reported results demonstrated that the proposed model yields
promising performance compared to the class-independent
formulation as well as to conventional multiclass classifica-
tion models.
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